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Abstract
Plasma is a framework for scalable off-chain computation. We describe and evaluate
Plasma Cash, an improved Plasma construction which leverages non-fungible tokens
and Sparse Merkle Trees to reduce the data storage and bandwith requirements for
users. We analyze the cryptoeconomic exit and challenge mechanisms used to keep user
funds secured, even when the Plasma Cash chain’s consensus algorithm is compromised.
A reference implementation is provided for evaluation. Finally, we briefly discuss fur-
ther improvements that can be made to the Plasma Cash protocol such as arbitrary
denomination payments, less user data checking, fast and optimistic exits.
Contents
1 Introduction 2
1.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Plasma Fundamentals 4
3 Plasma Cash 5
3.1 Sparse Merkle Trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3.2 Periodic Merkle Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.3 Non Fungible Tokens and Depositing a Coin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
3.4 Transferring a Coin and Verifying its History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
3.5 Exiting and Withdrawing a Coin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4 Attacks on Plasma Cash 10
4.1 Exit Spent Coin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.2 Exit of a Double Spend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
4.3 Exit with Invalid History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
4.4 Withhold and Challenge Exit of Spent Coin (Griefing) . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
12
09
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
7 N
ov
 20
19
5 Future Work 13
5.1 Arbitrary Denomination Payments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5.2 Reduce user data checking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
5.3 Faster and Inexpensive Withdrawals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
6 Conclusion 16
1 Introduction
Plasma is a scalability solution to increase the throughput a smart contract enabled
blockchain by allowing interoperable transfer of assets between blockchains. Assets are
deposited from the sending blockchain (mainchain), to the receiving blockchain (plas-
machain). Contrary to two-way pegged sidechains [1], funds stored in plasmachains can
safely be withdrawn to the mainchain through a dispute process where the mainchain is
responsible for the safety of the coins, often referred to as an exit. Safety is maintained even
if the plasmachain’s consensus mechanism is compromised, as long as the mainchain’s con-
sensus mechanism remains secure. It should be noted that Plasma improves throughput1
rather than latency2.
Plasma Cash leverages non-fungible tokens3 by making the funds deposited in the plas-
machain independent and unique [2]. This results in a simpler settlement protocol for
withdrawing funds back to the mainchain, by requiring less data checking on their coins,
compared to the technique mentioned in the original paper [3]. Discussions around this
technique have been found across the web, in ad-hoc discussions and videoconferences [4].
To date there exists no complete resource on the security and scalability guarantees of
Plasma Cash.
1.1 Contributions
Protocol Analysis We present a full analysis of the Plasma Cash technique, decomposing
it to its components, explaining parts of the protocol and its functionalities in detail. We
additionally explain the various extensions which can be added, along with the benefits and
tradeoffs they give.
Analysis of Attacks We discuss the currently known attacks on Plasma and how a
Plasma contract should be designed to mitigate these attacks. With proper mechanism
design and the attachment of ‘cryptoeconomic’ bonds on actions that may result in faults
we realize a system that is secure against adversaries, even if the adversaries have full control
of the plasmachain’s consensus mechanism.
1The number of transactions that can be finalized every N seconds
2The amount of time before a transaction is confirmed
3A non-fungible token (NFT) is a unique token. Only one copy can exist for a specific NFT.
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Implementation A reference implementation of Plasma Cash is provided at github.
com/loomnetwork/plasma-cash. It provides support for Ether and ERC20 tokens 4, as well
as ERC721 Non-Fungible tokens 5. The Plasma contract is token agnostic and extending it
to support more types of token standards is a trivial process.
1.2 Related Work
In this section we will briefly describe work that is being done towards scalability via other
techniques, each with its own tradeoffs. There are two approaches to scalability. Protocol
level scalability6, often referred to as Layer 1, and scaling through computation via Layer
2. Plasma is considered a Layer 2 scalability solution.
Sidechains A sidechain is a blockchain which has its own independently secured consensus
algorithm, and is pegged to another blockchain [1]. Value can be transferred from one
blockchain to another by relaying SPV proofs7. Verifying that blockchain A’s event has
occured on blockchain B requires SPV proofs which grow linearly with the number of
blocks8. It should be noted that users can only withdraw their funds back to the mainchain
if the sidechain’s consensus is secure and does not censor transactions or produce invalid
state changes, meaning that the consensus mechanism is the sidechain’s ‘custodian’. Using
a sidechain for scalability is thus limited by the security and decentralization tradeoffs
introduced by increasing capacity and throughput.
Payment Channel Networks A payment channel is a mechanism which enables two
parties to trade value in a rapid and feeless manner by exchanging signed messages which
represent the latest state of the channel. The state can be settled on the underlying
blockchain at any point in time. If a party attempts to settle an earlier state, the other party
can challenge/dispute within a bound time period and penalize the fraudulent party. An
on-chain transaction is required to initialize the channel. Channels can be unidirectional,
bidirectional and can be linked together to create Payment Channel Networks, which allow
two parties to trade with each other, even if they do not have a channel with each other, by
routing payments through intermediaries. Payment channels feature instant finality since
a payment can be considered complete the moment signed attestations about it are ex-
changed from the participating parties. In addition to the on-chain funding transaction
required during the initialization of a channel, Payment Channel Networks (cf. Lightning
Network, Raiden Network) require a capital lockup equal to the value being transferred, as
well as potential fees paid to intermediaries for routing payments.
4https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-20.md
5https://github.com/ethereum/EIPs/blob/master/EIPS/eip-721.md
6E.g. sharding and bigger blocks
7Simple Payment Verification: Proofs that allow clients to verify the inclusion of a transaction in a block
by verifying the block headers instead of downloading the whole block
8Recent research has shown that the proof growth can be reduced to be logarithmic [5]
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Generalized State Channels Extending the idea of payment channels, generalized state
channels tackle the problem of performing arbitrary computation off-chain, with the ability
to settle on-chain, e.g play a battleship game off-chain, with the ability to settle a dispute
about the general state of the game on-chain [6, 7].
2 Plasma Fundamentals
‘Classic’ Plasma The initial vision of Plasma describes a mechanism which enables con-
necting blockchains to a base blockchain often referred to as the ‘rootchain’ or the ‘main-
chain’ [3]. The mainchain acts as the final arbitrator in the case of disputes as shown in
Figure 1. Trees of plasmachains forming a hierarchy of blockchains similar to the court sys-
tem would also be possible such that a dispute can be escalated all the way to the supreme
court (the mainchain)
Figure 1: Multiple blockchains connected to a ‘mainchain’ [3].
A plasmachain that utilizes a potentially centralized consensus algorithm (e.g. Proof of
Authority) derives its security from the mainchain’s consensus algorithm. This is achieved
by publishing a merklized9 state root of each plasma block to the mainchain. The transaction
model used is UTXO based, similar to Bitcoin10.
Exits and challenges An exit is the mechanism by which a user expresses their intent
to withdraw a UTXO from the plasmachain back to their account on the mainchain. After
submitting the exit of a UTXO, the user needs to wait for a challenge period to pass, during
which other users can challenge their exit, by providing proof that it is invalid11.
A challenge is an attestation provided by another user, proving that the UTXO that is
being exited is invalid or has been spent. Challenges can either be non-interactive, where
the exit is instantly cancelled, or interactive where they require a response to the challenge
9The transaction set of each block gets inserted in a Merkle Tree, and the merkle root of that tree gets
published to a smart contract.
10https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Transaction
11This is a common technique also used in payment channels, whereby invalid attestations can be chal-
lenged and the fraudulent user gets penalized if the challenge is successful.
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before the challenge period is over. After the challenge period has passed, if there is no
outstanding challenge, an exit can be finalized, giving its owner the right to withdraw the
amount specified by the UTXO back to their mainchain account.
Exits and interactive challenges require users to attach a bond, as collateral. If a user’s
exit gets challenged and the challenge is valid, the collateral gets slashed and is sent to
the user who reported the fraud. This incentivizes users to act honestly, and creates a
crowdsourced system of watchers who are rewarded for reporting fraudulent activity.
3 Plasma Cash
Plasma Cash is a plasma construction with much less user data checking [2]. It utilizes
Non-Fungible-Tokens (NFTs) to reduce the user checking requirements to only the NFTs
that they own12. The system’s security relies on users fully authenticating a coin’s history
before accepting it as a payment by utilizing Sparse Merkle Trees, which allow the efficient
verification of inclusion and non-inclusion of a transaction in a block, as explained in the
next subsection.
3.1 Sparse Merkle Trees
A Merkle Tree is a data structure which allows to succinctly commit to a dataset and prove
the inclusion of a part of the committed dataset in O(log2(N)) steps instead of O(N), where
N is the number of elements in the dataset, via Merkle Proofs. The committed value is
called a Merkle Root. A Sparse Merkle Tree (SMTs) [8] is an ordered merkle tree, where
each element of the dataset is placed at the leaf with the index corresponding the element’s
index in the dataset. If an element of the dataset was not included in the Merkle Root, its
leaf is set to a special default value.
The inclusion of a transaction spending a coin in a block can be efficiently proven through
a Merkle Proof. The same method can be used to prove the non-inclusion of a spend of
a coin in a block. A coin can only be spent once per block because only 1 transaction at
its slot can ever exist. If a coin was not spent, the leaf is set to the hash of 0. A visual
representation of the above is given in Figure 2.
Further optimizations can be done to the verifier as suggested in [10] by precomputing
the default values of the SMT and by introducing a bitfield in the proof which acts as a
switch between choosing the next 32 bytes during the verification from the proof or from
the SMT’s default hashes. A reasonable estimation for a block containing 2378 transactions
results in proof sizes being 320 bytes, compared to normal proofs which would be 2048 (64
* 32) bytes, for a SMT of size 64.
12Plasma-MVP requires users to be constantly monitoring the plasmachain for fraudulent state transitions,
while Plasma Cash requires that users only watch the mainchain about fraudulent exits of coins that they
own
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(a) Merkle proof of
inclusion for coin A
(b) Merkle proof of
non-inclusion for coin
C
Figure 2: Merkle Proofs in a Sparse Merkle Tree [9]
3.2 Periodic Merkle Commitments
All Plasma designs rely on a plasmachain operator that commits the Merkle Root of each
generated block to the mainchain. If a Proof of Stake system is used, publishing a block
must be accompanied by a number of validator signatures, exceeding a pre-agreed threshold.
Whenever a Plasma Block’s root is committed to the rootchain, all valid transactions in
that given block can be considered finalized upon availability of the related witness data13
for the inclusion of these transactions. Since only the block root is committed to the
mainchain instead of all the included transactions, plasma can bundle together any number
of transactions, the only limit to the number of included transactions being the size of
the plasma block. The minimum finality time that can be achieved is the block time of
the rootchain (15 seconds in Ethereum). Given that every block must be published to
the mainchain, the operational costs for this process can become large. Operators can be
expected to trade bigger finality time for less maintenance costs by committing block roots
less often.
3.3 Non Fungible Tokens and Depositing a Coin
When value gets deposited in the plasma smart contract, a unique id and metadata key-
value pair gets generated for that token and is saved in the contract’s storage. The id is
the unique serial number of the coin, and is what makes the deposited coin non-fungible.
As a result, depositing 5 ETH two times creates two coins which have their own unique
transaction history and are independent from each other. The unique id can also be thought
of as a serial number, compared to fiat cash money.
After the coin gets saved in the smart contract, a block containing only the deposit
transaction is appended to the plasmachain14.
13By witness data we refer to the merkle proof of inclusion of that coin in the specified block
14Deposit blocks including only one transaction is an optimization, https://ethresear.ch/t/one-plasma-
cash-block-per-deposit-why/2674/
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3.4 Transferring a Coin and Verifying its History
Each coin in Plasma Cash has its own unique coin history. A coin receiver must verify that
the coin they are receiving has a valid history in order to accept it. A coin with invalid
history is counterfeit and cannot be withdrawn safely. In order to validate a coin’s history,
a set of merkle proofs of inclusion and non-inclusion for the coin since its initial deposit
must be sent to the receiver. The receiver can then proceed to verify that there were no
invalid spends of the coin in the coin’s history. This is done by verifying that the proofs
of inclusion and non-inclusion are valid against the plasma block merkle roots that were
published to the mainchain.
This imposes a heavy storage and bandwith burden on senders that want to transfer
a coin. Specifically, the proofs required to send a coin are O(t ∗ log2(N)) where t is the
number of blocks since a coin’s deposit and N is the number of coins the Plasma Cash chain
supports.
In a real world scenario where a buyer wants to buy a product from a vendor the
following is expected to happen, in a non-fraudulent case:
1. Buyer broadcasts transaction giving ownership of their coin to the seller
2. Transaction gets included in a block and witness data about its inclusion is made
available
3. Buyer verifies that the transaction was included in the block
4. Buyer sends the proofs of inclusion and non-inclusion to the vendor.
5. Vendor verifies the history of the coin along with the correct inclusion of the coin’s
transaction in the block.
6. Vendor gives the product to buyer
A transaction is a tuple: Tx(slot, parentBlock, newOwner, prevOwnerSignature).
A transaction that was included in a block is a combination of the previous tuple and a
merkle proof for the block: IncludedTx(tx, blkNumber, proof).
The algorithm for verifying the history of a coin is given in Figure 3
3.5 Exiting and Withdrawing a Coin
As described in Section 2, exits are the mechanism by which a coin can be withdrawn
from the plasmachain, and allow it to be transferred back to its owner’s account on the
mainchain.
Starting an exit for a coin requires providing the transaction that gave the exitor own-
ership of the coin signed by the previous owner in the coin’s history, tx, as well as a direct
ancestor of that transaction (the reason the parent transaction must also be provided is
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Protocol for proving and verifying a coin’s history
The prover sends two lists of IncludedTx elements to the Verifier, inclTx and
exclTx. The verifier has access to the Merkle Roots from the deployed Plasma
Contract on Ethereum via the variable root[blockNumber] as well as all the
committed block numbers for the coin, via the variable blocks.
We consider a VerifyMerkleProof(slot, hash, proof, blockNumber) algorithm which is
able to verify the merkle proof for a coin at a certain block number.
1: inclTx, exclTx← proof
2: // Ensure completion of included and excluded transactions’ blocks
3: Assert inclTx.keys ∪ exclTx.keys = blocks
4: // Ensure separation between blocks in included and excluded transactions
5: Assert inclTx.keys ∩ exclTx.keys = ∅
6: LastBlock ← DepositBlock
7: LastOwner ← DepositOwner
8: // Check the deposit transaction
9: if !VerifyMerkleProof(slot, inclTx[DepositBlock].tx.hash, itx[DepositBlock].proof,
itx[DepositBlock].blkNumber) then
10: return false
11: delete inclTx[DepositBlock]
12: // Check that included transactions are correct in the included blocks
13: for itx in inclTx do // Skip the deposit transaction
14: if !VerifyMerkleProof(slot, itx.tx.hash, itx.proof, itx.blkNumber) then
15: return false
16: // Reject double spends
17: if LastBlock 6= itx.tx.parentBlock then
18: return false
19: // Accept spends only with valid signatures
20: Sender ← ecrecover(itx.tx.hash, itx.tx.sig)
21: if Sender 6= LastOwner then
22: return false
23: LastBlock ← itx.blkNumber
24: LastOwner ← itx.tx.newOwner
25: // Check that there are no transactions in the excluded blocks
26: for itx in exclTx do // itx.tx should be empty
27: if !VerifyMerkleProof(slot, emptyHash, itx.proof, itx.blkNumber) then
28: return false
Figure 3: Proving and verifying a coin’s history in Plasma Cash
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explained in Section 4). Merkle proofs of inclusion need to also be provided for both trans-
actions.
1 2 3 4
startExit
Alice Bob Charlie
Alice
Figure 4: Alice deposits a coin from the mainchain to the plasmachain in Block 1. Alice sends the coin to
Bob in Block 2. Bob verifies the inclusion of the coin in Block 2. Block 3 gets submitted, without including
the coin. Bob sends the coin to Charlie in Block 4. Charlie has to verify the inclusion of the coin in Block
1 and 2, and the non-inclusion of the coin in Block 3. In order for Charlie to exit the coin received by Bob
he has to provide the signed transaction from Bob as well as a direct ancestor, in this case the transaction
from Alice to Bob. Charlie also needs to supply merkle proofs of inclusion for both of these transactions at
their respective blocks.
A coin can be modelled by a state machine. After starting an exit, the coin transitions
to the EXITING state. After the challenge (or maturity) period passes, the coin’s exit can
be finalized and it can transition to the EXITED state, from which it can be withdrawn to
a user’s wallet, as shown in Figure 5. Figure 6 illustrates the lifetime of an exit from its
initialization to its finalization. We further discuss challenges in Section 4.
Figure 5: The stages of an exit. After a coin transitions to the EXITED state, it can be withdrawn to its
owner’s wallet.
Figure 6: During its lifetime, an exit can be challenged during the maturity period. After its maturity
period is over, it can be finalized and the exiting coin can be withdrawn.
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4 Attacks on Plasma Cash
In this section we model the types of fraud attempts that users can engage in with or without
collusion with the plasmachain’s consensus mechanism. We create challenges that guard
against malicious behavior, guaranteeing safety as long as the party being attacked logs in15
at least once during the dispute period. The challenges described were first introduced in
[2, 11] and are further explained in this paper for clarity.
4.1 Exit Spent Coin
This is an attack which does not require collusion of any of the transacting parties with
the operator. An attacker (Alice) sends a coin to a victim (Bob). After both parties verify
its inclusion, the attacker immediately attempts to exit the spent coin16. Bob must log in
before the end of the challenge period and provide proof of a direct spend of the coin. An
example of this is shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Alice attempts to exit the coin that was included in Block N . A valid challenge provides the
inclusion of the transaction at Block N + X. Challenging with the transaction from Block N + Y is not
valid since it assumes the validity of its ancestors.
In the reference implementation, this is implemented via challengeAfter.
4.2 Exit of a Double Spend
This attack requires that the operator allows the inclusion of double spend transactions
(ie. two transactions involving the same coin and ancestor transactions but different new
owners included in two different blocks). In this case, The attacker (Alice) sends a coin
to the victim (Bob). After the inclusion of the transaction to Bob, Alice sends another
transaction to her colluding party (Charlie). Note that the operator here should notice that
Alice no longer owns the coin and reject the transaction, however we consider that they are
also colluding with Alice to steal Bob’s coin. From the mainchain contract’s point of view,
both Bob and Charlie are valid owners of the coin.
15Once the user logs in, they should challenge any exits that have been initiated for the coins they own
16Alice also supplies a security bond as discussed previously, to incentivize users to challenge if her exit is
fraudulent, like in this case
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Charlie can exit by providing the same parent transaction as the one Bob, given that
they both received it from the same spend of Alice. A valid challenge involves a transaction
between Charlie’s exiting and parent block, proving the double spend, as shown in Figure
8. Users should additionally check the coin’s history for double spends when receiving a
coin. In the below example, Charlie can send the coin to another user, the verification of
the merkle proofs will pass, however if they find transactions in the coin history with the
same parent they should only accept the transaction coming from the earliest owner of the
coin, since all the others are double spends.
Figure 8: Charlie attempts to exit the coin that was included in Block N + Y , which is a double spend
since the coin was already given to Bob at block N + X. A valid challenge provides the inclusion of the
transaction at Block N + X.
In the reference implementation, this is implemented via challengeBetween.
4.3 Exit with Invalid History
This type of attack requires collusion of the transacting parties with the operator to include
transactions which do not have valid ancestors. As an example, consider the case that the
victim (Alice) has a coin that she does not intend to spend. The attacker (Bob) colludes
with the operator to create a transaction that references an invalid transaction from Alice to
Bob, effectively giving Bob ownership of the coin, and sends that transaction to his colluding
party (Charlie). After the transaction gets included, the transaction to Charlie can be used
as a valid ancestor transaction. Taking advantage of that, Charlie sends the coin to Dylan
(another colluding party). From Dylan’s perspective, he has a valid transaction signed from
the previous owner of the coin, along with a valid ancestor which is the transaction from
Bob to Charlie. Dylan can now perform a seemingly valid exit.
Note that precisely because of this type of attack, we require that users must validate
the full history of a coin they receive in a transaction. If Charlie was not a colluding party
and they were a victim as well, he would not accept the transaction because he would have
noticed that the coin has an invalid history.
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When Dylan initiates the exit, Alice notices that and submits an interactive challenge,
with which she claims that she is the latest valid owner of the coin. We require this challenge
to be interactive and bonded, as it may be the case that Alice is not the last valid owner of
the coin, and a spend of her to another user may exist. This leaves a window for a response
to her challenge which invalidates it (contrary to the previous two challenges which were
non-interactive). Multiple of these challenges can be active for an exit. During finalization
the coin must have zero pending challenges that were not responded to, in order for the
exit to be successful. The full game is shown in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Dylan attempts to exit a coin that has invalid history. Challenger challenges by claiming that
Alice is the last valid owner of the coin. A valid response must be a valid transaction that nullifies that
claim. In this case this does not exist in this case since Bob and the Operator colluded to have the invalid
transaction included. An Alice-to-Bob transaction could be used as a valid response as illustrated by the
red arrows.
In the reference implementation, this is implemented via challengeBefore and
respondChallengeBefore.
4.4 Withhold and Challenge Exit of Spent Coin (Griefing)
Griefing is a special type of attack which exploits inefficiencies of the protocol to ‘bully’ the
transacting parties and either block them from some action (disallowing the exit of a coin
for example) or forcing them to forfeit some constant amount of on-chain collateral when
they attempt to settle a transaction on-chain.
In this attack, consider the scenario where Alice wants to send Bob a coin in exchange
for a product. Bob will only send the product after he has validated the coin’s history and
after he has verified that the payment’s transaction was included in a block. This requires
that the operator makes the witness data for the transaction’s inclusion available, so that
both parties can validate the transaction’s inclusion. Instead, the operator publishes a block
including the transaction, however they withhold the witness data.
As a result, neither Alice nor Bob can know if the transaction was actually included.
At this point, Alice must assume that the operator is malicious and initiate an exit for the
coin (she can pay Bob through an on-chain transaction). The operator can now challenge
the exit with a Exit Spent Coin challenge, as discussed in Section 4.1. During this process,
they are required to reveal witness data (which they were previously withholding). This
provides enough information for both parties to know that the transaction was successfully
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included in a block. However, in this process Alice incurred a constant griefing vector by
losing the collateral she put up when initiating the exit as shown in Figure 10.
Figure 10: The operator steals the bond but the transaction was revealed.
This can be mitigated by constructing a different type of exit that forces the settlement
of a withheld transaction to a receiving party other than the exitor. The coined term for
this type of exit has been ‘limbo exit’ and the transaction being withheld is an ‘in-flight’
transaction, given that no party other than the operator can attest that the transaction has
settled or not (and thus is in ‘limbo’ or still ‘in-flight’) [12].
5 Future Work
In this section we go summarize the existing proposals for improving the Plasma Cash
protocol. In-depth analysis of each technique is not in scope and the reader is encouraged
to refer to the citations for further insight.
5.1 Arbitrary Denomination Payments
The protocol for Plasma Cash is simplified compared to other Plasma versions due to the
usage of non fungible tokens. This has the disadvantage that for financial use cases, such
as buying a product, a user has to provide a coin with the exact product value, or provide
a coin with higher value and expect another coin as change, similar to how physical cash is
used in real life.
Splits and Merges Proposals to allow coins to be split and merged are made in [13, 14].
Splitting a token involves creating new tokens that represent a previously unified token.
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Merging involves creating a new token out of a list of separate unspent tokens.
Plasma Debit A protocol that allows arbitrary denomination payments of a coin is
Plasma Debit which acts as an extension to Plasma Cash [15]. In Plasma Debit, instead of
having a set denomination, each coin has a capacity value v and a varying value a17. The
following conditions apply:
1. after a coin is deposited v = a.
2. a ≤ v
3. a of the coin’s denomination is owned by the coin’s owner
4. v − a of the coin’s denomination is owned by the operator
Each coin in Plasma Debit can be considered as a bidirectional payment channel between
the Plasma Operator and the coin’s owner. Arbitrary payments between two users can be
initiated by reducing the balance of the sender’s coin by an amount, and by atomically18
increasing the balance of one of the receiver’s coins by the same amount. The primary limi-
tations in this construction is that the receiver must have a coin that is undercollateralized
(e.g to receive X currency units, it must be the case that X + a ≤ v).
Regarding the creation of undercollateralized coins, the protocol can be extended to
allow the operator to deposit collateral, in order to generate coins with a = 0 on deposit,
or increase the v while keeping a the same of an already existing coin. Markets can be
expected to form where undercollateralized coins with larger v have more value than coins
with smaller v, similarly to how payment channels with more capacity are more useful due
to their increased routing capabilities.
Plasma Debit is a useful construct not only because it allows for arbitrary payments in
Plasma Cash, but because it allows for behavior that can be characterized as transferrable-
payment-channels. While traditional payment channels between two parties are non trans-
ferrable and require knowing all transacting parties beforehand, transferring a Plasma Debit
coin from Alice to Bob is effectively the transfer of a payment channel between Alice and
the operator to Bob.
Plasma Defragmentation When depositing a coin, users get multiple coins of very small
equal value totalling the value of the deposited coin. Making a payment involves sending
multiple of these small denomination coins to the receiver. By exiting a subtree of coins with
the same owner, a user can efficiently withdraw and transact in arbitrary denominations.
Users that utilize this technique eventually end up with various coins fragmented coins that
are not efficiently exitable by a subtree. Defragmentation solves that by rearranging coins
between the transacting parties so that users maintain lists with coins that have the most
consecutive ids possible, allowing efficient subtree multi-exits.
17Each coin can be thought of as an account with maximum capacity of v
18Either all state transitions execute simultaneously, or none
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5.2 Reduce user data checking
As discussed in Section 3.4, a receiver of a coin has to verify its history in order to make
sure that the coin they are receiving is valid. Otherwise, they may be receiving a coin with
invalid history, which if exited would be susceptible to Challenge with Invalid History from
Section 4.3. A proof of inclusion or non-inclusion for a coin in a chain with 216 coins is
512 bytes, per block. Assuming a Plasma Block frequency of 15 seconds19, this means that
after a year, a sender would be required to transfer more than 1 GB of data of proofs to
the receiver, so that the receiver can validate the coin’s history. This is expensive both in
terms of bandwith and storage.
Checkpointing of coin history A solution to this problem is checkpointing the history
of coins [16]. A plasmachain can be expected to have a large number of coins, and as a
result a mechanism for efficient mass checkpointing of coins needs to be constructed. After a
coin gets checkpointed, proving the validity of a coin’s history requires checking the history
of the coin from its latest checkpoint until the current block, which reduces the amount of
merkle proofs that need to be validated.
Compressing non-inclusion proofs The largest part of data checking in Plasma Cash
stems from the verification of non-inclusion proofs. ZK-SNARKs can be used to create a
succinct constant-size proof of non-inclusion for multiple blocks for a coin which can be
transmitted at low bandwith cost, and can be verified by the receiver in constant-time.
Alternatively, a bloom filter hash can be published alongside the merkle root at each block
by the operator, succinctly committing to the coin ids spent in each block, allowing users to
verify the non-inclusion of a coin in blocks. This approach requires data availability from the
plasma operator so that users can retrieve the raw bloom filter from its published hash, as
well as revealing the bloom filter on-chain during an exit, which is expensive in storage terms.
Finally, after an initialization phase involving a trapdoor parameter, an RSA accumulator
can be published alongside the merkle root at each block by the operator, which allows
batch proofs of non-inclusion of a coin, effectively reducing the amount of proofs required
for the validation of a coin to two (one for its inclusion in a block, and an aggregate proof
for all the non-inclusions) [17].
5.3 Faster and Inexpensive Withdrawals
Tokenized Exits A user needs to wait a predefined challenge period when initiating an
exit, in order to allow other users to verify that the exit is valid. User experience can be
improved by allowing the exitor to instantly redeem the value of their exit by tokenizing it
as a NFT and selling it in an open marketplace. The buyer of the tokenized exit will wait
the challenge period instead of the exitor [18]. The tokenized exit’s buyout price is equal to
19The Ethereum mainnet block time
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the value of the coin that is under the exit. The tokenized exit can be expected to be sold
at a discount, depending on the exitor’s time preference.
Optimistic Exits By assuming that a user is honest, the merkle proofs and the raw
transactions can be omitted during the initiation of an exit. This reduces the exit’s required
transaction fees. An additional non-interactive challenge must be provided which reveals
the previously omitted exit parameters and if the challenge is successful cancels the exit
[19].
6 Conclusion
In this paper we presented Plasma Cash, a plasma construction which can be used to
construct non-custodial arbitrarily centralized sidechains which maintain safety, contrary
to two-way pegged sidechains which do not allow the safe withdrawal of funds in case the
sidechain consensus is compromised. Plasma Cash can be used to offload computation
from the mainchain and improve scalability, which is a pressing issue for decentralized
permissionless blockchains. We presented the required mechanisms as well as examples of
how users interact with the system in order to deposit, transact and withdraw their funds.
A reference implementation which is used in production is provided. Further improvements
to the protocol are described, with respect to allowing arbitrary denomination payments,
improving user experience, and making light clients more efficient.
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